took notes at the University of Maryland library, the comments-mostly anonymous and mostly angry-piled higher and higher.
What gave my esoteric "puerility" post such wide circulation, and why was that circulation particularly pronounced within a wholly unintended and (nominally) wholly unreceptive public?2 I wish here to sketch a few conjectures on what the editors of this special section have called the "semipublic," which I will suggest is an apt term for the present phase of academic blogging. Blogging in its heyday a decade ago seemed to promise a new, potentially more democratic and more public form of academic engagement, as the historian Dan Cohen memorably explained in a 2006 post energetically titled "Professors, Start Your Blogs."3 Yet as its costs-and their uneven distribution across classes of actors-have become increasingly visible, it has also brought more general dynamics of public discourse into relief. Far from constituting an ethereal, "virtual" realm apart, the semipublic Web seems to enact the vicissitudes of print and televisual circulation in more intensive forms, powerfully renewing questions about public and private speech and the norms that we assign to each.
Blogging was widely declared dead around 2013.4 In the wake of the demise of the popular RSS readers Bloglines and Google Reader, blogs and the publics that they call into being have become disaggregated and redistributed across social networks (Lardinois; Green) .5 My own site analytics tell me that I no longer have a modest but steady readership driven mostly by RSS readers; instead, I have the occasional massive inlux toward a particular post, driven by social networks like Facebook, Tw it te r, and Tumblr. Under those circumstances, it was no wonder that my discontented readers in the autumn of 2012 were unaware that I'd been writing (semi)publicly about puerility for five years. Since social networks route connections through (constructed, not necessarily "authentic") identities, oten putting one's department chair, one's mother, and one's high school bandmate in the lat category of "friend," they tend not to foster what Helen Nissenbaum has called "contextual integrity" (136-38).6 "Virality"-usually restricted to a few related discursive communities-is just one possible state for any given blog post. General obscurity is a far more likely possibility, and it serves as a widely relied-on (though legally unprotected) mode of pseudoprivacy in the age of search engines and hypersurveillance. Needles in an unimaginably big haystack, we make our peace with the National Security Agency's surveillance and Google's easy access to our e-mail and personal information because we know that we are statistically unlikely to be singled out. he Google cloud service Drive explicitly makes use of this form of pseudoprivacy by ofering a semipublic documentsharing option: the document is accessible to anyone in possession of the long, hard-toguess URL, with no password; it is not protected, but, unindexed by search engines, it is functionally private. Many people treat their niche or low-readership blogs in this wayjust as we might have a personal conversation with a friend while walking in a park.7 But the general obscurity of the blog, or the narrowness of the imagined audience, is no guarantee of anything-never mind old culture-wars canards about the "exclusionary" nature of academic language (Palumbo-Liu 172). Since the diminishment of RSS and the increased importance of social sharing, it can be diicult to predict whether a given post will ind a large public or no public, to say nothing of which public or when. Any given utterance or image online is latently public, even if by intention and in practice private: it is semipublic. Indeed, belated surges of attention will, zombie-like, occasionally beset a longforgotten post, only to lapse again. I received a straggling scolding comment on that 2012 blog post just last week. Thus, the socialmedia-governed semipublic sphere is "un-canny" in Freud's sense, in which "everything is unheimlich that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light" (225).
Semipublicness thus reveals the complexity and diiculty that attend putting scholarship online, even when, as Cohen argues, "it's part of our duty as teachers, experts, and public servants." Michael Warner has sympathetically identiied a common critique of academic writing: that it is, in a word, cowardly, failing to risk any real "orientation to strangers and the submission of discourse to estranging paths of circulation" (150). he let political theorist Jodi Dean has ofered a trenchant elaboration of this stance, in the context of the comments from avowed neo-Nazis that appear in her blog comment queue. Dean's is a principled refusal to engage:
I've never addressed White [one of the neoNazi commenters] directly in response. In part, I don't know what to say. It's as if his remarks shatter the presumptions and expectations that enable me to speak, exposing their speciicity, their fragility, their context dependency. I also don't engage him because of a more general guideline I follow in not debating racist and anti-Semitic positions. I don't want to participate in enabling such hate to be within the parameters of the permissible.
At the same time, as Dean explains further, the very setting of such boundaries is revealing-neither simple nor self-righteous, but productively troubling, an opening up to one's real closures, contra fantasies of an ideally discursive public sphere emerging on an "open" Web.8 As she continues: But White's incursion, I should probably say "participation," because unwanted, because a transgression disrupting and unsetting my expectations [,] is valuable insofar as it challenges me to take responsibility for the speciicity of my practices and assumptions. I can't pretend to be inclusive, to respect all others. . . . he risk of an encounter with the unwanted and the call to take responsibility for not inviting them in, for excluding them, is thus the opening blogs provide.
Real risk and transgression are intellectually valuable, Dean points out, and yet are not unqualiied goods. he semipublic nature of blogging produces an openness or "opening," but one that forces us to recognize the conditions of possibility for the discourses in which we wish to engage, and disallows the fantasy of universal accessibility that is so oten attached to simplistic calls for academics to "educate the public" (Kristof) . his is especially true of literary studies, to which attaches, as Rey Chow has observed, an expectation "that humanistic knowledge should continue to be universally available and relevant in the sense that everyone should be entitled to it (whereas the sciences and the trade professions are allowed to have much more stringent membership qualiications)" (96).9 he liberal hope invested in academic blogging is that academic discourses are robust, not fragile; that they are not context-dependent; and that jumping platforms will do them no damage because they are essentially "universally available," and only contingently and for silly traditional reasons "locked up" in specialized journals.10 As Dean notes, actual academic blogging practices reveal that the reverse is true: bloggers must each make a practical choice about the conditions under which they are meaningfully readable, if only in the invisible labor of comment moderation. Blogging's ability to remove certain physical barriers to access forces a confrontation with the intractability-indeed, the inevitability-of other, less arbitrary barriers.11
In forcing us to avow nonarbitrary terms of engagement, then, academic blogging does not operate on the model that is so oten attributed to online autodidactic learning, in which a disembodied, universal subject, unencumbered by the constraints of race, class, gender, sexuality, disability, or age-what the cyberlibertarian John Perry Barlow once Public and private are learned along with such terms as "active" and "passive," "front" and "back," "top" and "bottom." hey can seem quasi-natural, visceral, fraught with perils of abjection and degradation or, alternatively, of cleanliness and self-mastery. hey are the very scene of selhood and scarcely distinguishable from the experience of gender and sexuality.
he semipublic, which toggles so easily between public and private, visible and obscure, is thus deeply implicated in the enforcement of rapidly shiting, contextual norms of embodiment, especially of sex, gender, race, disability, and age. hus, the Silicon Valley cultural critic Shanley Kane has argued that being labeled "public" on the Internet is frequently no more than an excuse for the abuse of those whose bodies misalign with dominant expectations of what should be public: "for the rest of us, with visibility comes harassment, stalking, threats, loss of career opportunity and mobility, constant public humiliation, emotional and sometimes physical violence." As Marilee Lindemann has observed, anonymity, pseudonymity, and outright fictionality-strategies for being private-in-public-have long been the protections of those whose right to address a public is in question (211). For this reason, the early Google+ policy of requiring its users to go by "real names" attracted a great deal of controversy and critique: social media are where such protections are most needed (MacKinnon and Lim; boyd, "'Real Names' Policies").
In this context, with utterance and its circulation so closely identiied with the circulation of bodies, utterances routinely operate as proxies for bodies, able to give and receive aggression-yet whether they are understood as aggressors or targets of aggression is contextual and positional. Numerous critics have shown how profoundly perceptions about embodiment afect what is understood as legitimately or illegitimately public, including online.12 To be semipublic has costs-the costs of the incursions Dean describes-and they are borne disproportionately by those whose nonnormative embodiment qualifies their perceived right to address a public, even when their semipublic utterances were never intended for a wide audience. For example, Medieval PoC, the pseudonymous blogger who runs the art history Tumblr People of Color in European Art History, receives regular antiblack hate mail and other harassment that assumes the blogger is African American ("Moment").13 he blog primarily posts images of medieval and early modern artworks that depict people of color, countering an erroneous belief that there was ever a "pure," all-white Europe. In many ways it is an ideal instance of academic blogging: accessible, yet ofering a resource that is not otherwise widely available. But in some arenas (speciically the message board Reddit), this is evidently enough to incite assumptions about the author's body and denounce its presence in the online semipublic sphere.14 Merely being perceived as nonnormatively embodied online is all too oten treated as a transgression warranting punishment. As one of Medieval PoC's harassers frames it:
We aren't the ones digging up this [personal] information: it's already there. We just collect it. Anything that happens to them [Medieval PoC and other bloggers] in terms of harassment is entirely their fault: we cannot be held responsible for them deciding to make a "target" of themselves by their own volition. . And yet, since such norms are contextual and degrees of privacy and publicity are not knowable in advance, the semipublic realm continually produces and propagates ambiguities around just those norms. his may explain why charges of immodest, uncivil, attention-seeking (i.e., striving for an out-of-order publicness), and inappropriate so regularly attend online discourse, most recently in the University of Illinois's controversial dehiring of Professor Steven Salaita, apparently in response to once obscure (but now widely and carefully parsed) tweets that were judged to be, as Chancellor Phyllis M. Wise put it, "disrespectful" (Dunn; Jaschik). A constant state of "Schrödinger's publicness" means that online utterances are enormously prone to being perceived as violating social norms. Even Cohen's 2006 call takes refuge in the language of respectability, distancing academic blogging from the improper utterances of "self-involved, insecure, oversexed teens and twentysomethings." Some utterances (by minors, pertaining to sexuality, personal), Cohen suggests, are by nature private, and we are right to shrink from their bad publicness on blogs. Unlike these instances, however, Cohen argues, academic blogs don't inappropriately place something personal in public view. They need not threaten the academic norm in which public broadly means "published" (usually peer-reviewed) and therefore trustworthy: "[T] here's good and bad obsession. What the critics of blogs are worried about is the bad kind-the obsession that drives people to write about their breakfast in excruciating detail. Yet . . . obsession-properly channeled and focused on a worthy subjecthas its power. It forges experts." Cohen thus explicitly links expertise with a congeniality to preexisting structures of epistemological stability that the historian of science Steven Shapin has described as "civility."15 Such social markers, Shapin argues, are far from trivial; they constitute the very conditions of knowledge production (xxvi, 36). If, online, nobody knows you're a dog-that is, it is dificult to know who is trustworthy-academic blogs, Cohen reassures the skeptics, can shore up the markers of civility that cue our sense of the appropriately public and private.
Cohen's suggestion-explicitly made in the context of RSS's then rising prominencethat academic blogging can almost always successfully reproduce other media's markers of civility (i.e., of trustworthiness) is belied by the semipublic nature of today's social Web and the platform jumping it facilitates. We can see the instability of such markers in Dean's encounter with neo-Nazi commenters and her subsequent avowal of the need to restrict the terms of engagement. We can also see it in the harassment experienced by Medieval PoC, which treats the author as a transgressor simply for being "there" while (ostensibly) nonwhite. Likewise, when I inadvertently engaged a much less distant public of economists and fans of economists, basic premises like the sociality of scientiic knowledge were received as beyond the pale, no matter how many markers of academic civility (such as my real name, institutional and contact information, and formal citations) the blog bore. here is no performance of civility (in Shapin's sense) that does not look like incivility in another context, and the semipublic Web means that what Dean calls "the incursion of the unwanted" is nearly inevitable, whether we understand ourselves as the transgressors ("TMI," "attention-seeking," "disrespectful," inappropriately addressing a public from a body seen as inherently nonpublic) or the transgressed upon (such as the many bloggers and comment moderators who encounter substantial hate speech and threats of violence [Wilson] ).
Because performances of academic civility are only legible in particular contexts, the fantasy of a universal, context-independent civility-whether a good-faith aspiration aimed at increasing access to scholarship, as in Cohen's version, or a selectively applied tool for curtailing academic freedom-is ultimately unavailable to the semipublic intellectual. Meanwhile, other approaches to the challenges of the semipublic have emerged online. The hyperironized, performatively oversharing aesthetics of many Tumblr accounts and "weird Twitter"-shared, not coincidentally, with the erstwhile Internetoriented poetic practice known as larf-intentionally exploits the anxieties raised by semipublicness (Herrman; Bernstein) . Although hyperbolic performativity is not oten a good option for academic bloggers, it points a way forward, or at least onward. Recognizing in advance that the Web is not a Habermasian public sphere of rational discourse, such performances reveal all utterances as vulnerable and in some way, as the poet Gary Sullivan has described larf, "not okay" (Bern stein). he answer is not to aspire to the iction of a universal civility, and still less to shun what Warner calls "the necessary risk of publicness" by evading online discourse altogether (151). Rather, the uncanny, temporally messy, shiting quality of the semipublic suggests that what is needed is less a social media policy than a poetics, one that avows and works creatively with its own constraints.
NOTES
Many thanks to Miriam Posner and Liliana Loobourow for helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay.
1. Leslie Fiedler's "bad boy" is an obviously related igure.
2. I say "(nominally) wholly unreceptive" because readers let so many comments telling me how very unreceptive they were, while at the same time vigorously visiting, linking, and generating heated discourse both in my comment stream and elsewhere on the Web, much in the manner of the bourgeois talking about not talking about sex (Foucault 17) .
3. I am leaving aside, for the purposes of this essay, the important question of academic blogging's contribution to the culture of unpaid academic overwork and "always-on" engagement (Bowles; Nguyen).
4. Hardaway; Kabadayi; Kottke, "R.I.P." and "Blog"; Tracy. Insert joke here about writing about academic blogging for PMLA a year ater blogging was declared dead.
5. RSS is a method for distributing online material to readers as it is published so that they don't have to visit Web sites and retrieve it. It was speculated that Google Reader was speciically cannibalized by Google's new social network, Google+ (Eaton).
6. Aaron Bady has written usefully about the Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg's avowed hostility to contextual integrity. Danah boyd, studying young people's uses of social media, has noted that " [f] or many of the teens I interviewed, Facebook was the primary place where friend groups collide. Other services-like Tumblr or Twitterwere more commonly used by teens who were carving out their place in interest-driven communities" (It's 39).
7. As Miriam Posner pointed out to me, unlike Google docs, blogs are usually indexed by search engines, a distinction that reveals the varying degrees of privacy by obscurity that operate on the Web.
8. Cass Sunstein usefully reviews some socialscientiic literature on the shortcomings of deliberative discourse as a decision-making procedure.
9. he nature of scientiic authority in relation to the popular and the public is also widely misconstrued (Daum) .
10. This is not to discount the admirable goals of open-access journals but rather to distinguish between diferent kinds of accessibility. he moralizing tenor of much recent debate around open access too oten elides nonarbitrary barriers to access.
11. As Nissenbaum points out, "Almost everythingthings that we do, events that occur, transactions that
